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This essay begins with a review of several different approaches to the problem of
divine action in the world, in light ofthefindings ofscience. Specifically, the speculation
of Arthur Peacocke, John Polkinghorne and Nancey Murphy are elucidated and cri-
tiqued. Finding that Murphy, in founding her metaphysics on ontological reductionism,
engenders theological reductionism, the author draws some conclusions are as to ele-
ments of a theologically attractive position.
Science, in restricting its interest to the
empirically testable public domain, can
function without metaphysics. Science has
no need of God. Theology posits a God
who acts in the world, whose reality sci-
ence purports to describe. And so, in a dia-
logue between science and theology, the
burden of explanation rests on theology
when addressing the question, How does
God act in our world?
Nancey Murphy accepts this burden, in
her essay entitled, "Divine Action in the
Natural Order: Buridan's Ass and
Schrodinger's Cat." However, rather than
dialogue with science, she embarks on an
adoption of science. And in assuming the
reality of physics, she limits the reality of
God. In founding her metaphysics on onto-
logical reductionism, she engenders theo-
logical reductionism. Her argument is
fraught with ambiguities, contradictions,
theological conveniences and less-than-in-
spiring concepts of God. But worse, from
the point of view here taken, her argument
undermines both divine and human agency.
My approach will be first to address the
fundamental change in science that has given
rise to new possibilities for speculation on di-
vine activity. I will then elucidate and critique
the speculations of both Arthur Peacocke and
John Polkinghorne concerning divine action.
After addressing Murphy's critique of each, I
will then critique Murphy's thesis. At each
stage, consideration will be given to the effects
on the concept of God of speculation. Finally,
I wish to consider a more fruitful ground for
dialogue between science and theology.
In classical physics, every event had a
physical cause. God was the primary cause,
and all else happened by means of second-
ary causes. Newtonian physics "led to a
view of the world as mechanical, determin-
istic and predictable." ' And while Newton
still allowed for God to be active in this
machine-like, post-creation universe, deism
arose as the prime theology of science. God
set the universe in motion and then retired
from it. It was then but a short step to the
total elimination of God from the scientific
picture of a causally determined universe.
With the dawning of quantum physics and
chaos theory, this picture has changed.
As astrophysicist William Stoeger ex-
plains, quantum theory posits that
at [sub]microscopic levels there is an
irreducible indeterminism, represented
both by the Heisenberg uncertainty
principle and the unlocalizability of
unmeasured particle-waves. 2
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For quantum theorists, indeterminism at the
sub-atomic level is an ontological reality.
Chaos theory posits the reality of "cha-
otic dynamic systems." 3 These systems have
an underlying determinism. That is, "their
future states are, in principle, entirely deter-
mined by their present state and the forces
acting on them.'* 4 However, it is impossible
to "specify their initial states with infinite
precision. . . [as they] eventually lose the abil-
ity to predict [future] behaviour." 5 For chaos
theorists, unpredictability in chaotic systems
is an epistemological reality.
It is in chaos theory that Polkinghorne
grounds his metaphysics of divine agency.
"The exquisite sensitivity of chaotic
While Polkinghorne 's proposal gives
primacy to the harbor of science while
practicing docking procedures for
theology, his metaphysics is satisfying
on several counts.
systems... means that they are intrinsically
unpredictable and un-isolable in charac-
ter."
6 Polkinghorne posits that while bot-
tom-up causality sets the whole system in
motion, as it where, the "patterns of pos-
sibility are brought about by sensitive re-
sponses to infinitesimal disturbances of the
system." 7
Being a critical realist, Polkinghorne
walks quickly from his base in epistemologi-
cal unpredictability to stand in ontological
indeterminism. "These epistemological prop-
erties signal that ontologically much of the
physical world is open and integrated in char-
acter."
8 Because much change, through the
amplification effect, can happen after the ini-
tial bottom-up causality, "there is scope for
the activity of further causal principles." 9
There is room for God.
Polkinghorne sees God's agency as hav-
ing an "holistic top-down character... con-
cerned with the formation of dynamic pattern,
rather than with transactions of energy." I()
God's agency is by way of "active informa-
tion." " God provides the context within
which "the behaviour of the parts [is] influ-
enced by their overall context." I2 While bot-
tom-up causality is a transfer of energy, top-
down causality is a transfer of information
within an holistic context. "'Clockwork' sys-
tems, insensitive to the details of circum-
stance... [remain] unmodified" 13 while the
whole is free to respond to God.
Polkinghorne further speculates con-
cerning the essence of complementarity. As
p the "apparently quali-
tatively different char-
acters of wave and par-
ticle [are] present in a
single entity, light...
[and as] the apparently
qualitatively different
realms of the material
and the mental" are
present in each person,
so chaotic systems are
"influenced by both
energetic transactions
and by active information." 14 Dual-action
monism makes room for God.
While Polkinghorne's proposal gives
primacy to the harbor of science while prac-
ticing docking procedures for theology, his
metaphysics is satisfying on several counts.
It respects the findings of science, entering
into an open dialogue of possibility. It re-
spects theology. The mystery and open
agency of God are preserved. God is not
seen as "interact[ing] with the world by the
careful calculated adjustment of the infini-
tesimal details of initial conditions." 15 God
is not a cosmic mechanic. The human ex-
perience of agency is preserved. Persons
of faith experience themselves as respond-
ing to the context of God. And this free
response to circumstance is not undermined
at the subatomic level. The possibility of
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fundamental agency is not deleted from this
metaphysics.
Nor does Polkinghorne, furthermore,
claim to have all the answers. He allows that
while dual-aspect monism is a useful concept,
"consciousness is a much more profound and
mysterious property than history formation by
active information." lh Like the chaos theory
he invokes, Polkinghorne's metaphysics—in-
deed Polkinghorne's God, for whom the "fu-
ture is still inherently unknowable," "—re-
mains refreshingly open to new possibilities.
Peacocke is also open to science, but
his account of divine action differs from
Polkinghorne's in two important respects. In
the first place, while accepting the unpre-
dictability of chaos theory, he does not move
from this epistemological unpredictability to
ontological indeterminacy. Secondly, while
positing top-down causality as the mode of
God's interaction with the world. Peacocke
does not ground this possibility in the un-
predictability of bottom-up causality. In
common with Polkinghorne, Peacocke en-
visions God's influence on the world as be-
ing in the nature of information, not energy.
For Peacocke, chaos theory, with its un-
predictable variables, makes probable "a
looser form of causal coupling at [the] mi-
cro-level than had been taken for granted in
classical, deterministic (Laplacian) causal-
ity." IX Causality is not eliminated; only clas-
sical, deterministic causality. Through am-
plifications of fluctuations since the initial
conditions, new patterns emerge at the
macro-level. The dynamic systems of chaos
theory are non-linear. Rather they are or-
ganic, self-organizing systems. "Through
the amplification of small fluctuations," he
writes, nature "can provide natural systems
with access to novelty." 19
Another important feature to note is that
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
The whole bestows new boundary conditions
on the parts, and in this new situation they
behave differently. Peacocke calls this be-
havior "whole-part constraint." 20 Further,
the whole is to be understood as comprising
complex levels of hierarchy. And none can
be reduced to the features of the others.
There are emergent realities at higher levels
of complexity. The system as a whole inter-
acts with the parts and with other systems.
It is within this concept of the whole that
God must act.
And there is room for God, not as for
Polkinghorne in an ontological gap at the
fundamental level of reality, but at a super-
venient level of a totality that is flexible and
open-ended. 21 God can exercise constraints
without upsetting the laws of nature, with-
out intervening. Peacocke provides an hu-
man analogy for God 's agency in our world.
Holistic states of the brain-as-a-
whole... could legitimately be referred to
in non-reductionist mentalist language
as a real modality of the total unitive
event which is the activity of thinking
that is accomplished by the human-
brain-in-the-human-body. 22
By analogy God "exerts constraints upon the
world-as-a-whole." 23 Peacocke calls God's
interaction through a flow of information,
communication.
Peacocke maintains God's otherness:
God is ontologically different from the
world, yet both transcendent and immanent.
For Peacocke, God is the "continuing supra-
personal, unifying Agent acting, often selec-
tively, upon all-that-is, as God's own self
purposes." 24 As with Polkinghorne,
Peacocke 's metaphysics tacks theology onto
science. And again, as with Polkinghorne.
Peacocke 's metaphysics is satisfying on sev-
eral counts. Top-down causality fits well
with our experience of ourselves and our
world. The mystery of God and both divine
and human agency are preserved. Divine
agency of this sort leaves room for individual
response within the constraints of the whole.
Less satisfying is the fact that both
Polkinghorne and Peacocke give primacy to
science and try to fit God into a scientific
gap, ontological or otherwise. However,
their metaphysical proposals do seem to en-
courage an expanded concept of God. And
most importantly, they feed the imagination
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as it ponders the awesomeness of creation
at both the micro and macro levels and the
wonder of our God, who wants to interact
and create with us.
In contrast, and with all due respect.
Murphy's metaphysics ultimately constricts
the concept of God and boggles rather than
feeds the imagination. She accepts the pos-
sibilities for divine action that follow from
Peacocke's account of top-down causation.
She accepts it, because it "explains how hu-
man free agency is possible within a highly
deterministic universe." 25 However, she
finds his analogy from human to divine
Murphy posits that the unpredictability
inherent in chaos theory gives God,
not ontological room in an otherwise
causally determined order, but episte-
mological room within which God can
work without upsetting the perception
of law-like natural order
agency, from human-brain-to-human-body
to God's agency on the world-as-a-whole,
to be unhelpful. Murphy rejects this anal-
ogy for two reasons. Since God has no body,
the analogy does not elucidate the manner
of God's agency in the world. It is hard to
see her logic here, since surely the analogy
was meant to illuminate God as mind, trans-
mitting information, and the world as the
entity, or body, toward which and within
which God acts. Her second objection pro-
tects the ontological otherness of God.
[I]f we understand mental events as a
function of the operation of the
organism at a high level of organization,
we. ..have trouble applying the account
to God [because] God would then be the
world-mind or the world-soul.26
Murphy's theology cannot accommodate
this possibility.
Her ultimate rejection of top-down cau-
sation as a sufficient explanation for divine
activity in our world rests on her observation
that "the effect of the environment is always
mediated by specific changes in the entity it-
self." 27 The entity must already be fitted for,
as it were, and respond to the environmental
factors that impinge upon it. And so, in the
same way, "top-down causation by God
should be also expected to be mediated by
specific changes in the affected entities." 28
And so, she sees the need to "supple-
ment. . .Peacocke's top-down approach" with
a bottom-up account of God's causal input. 29
However, ostensibly,
she does not accept
Polkinghorne's account of
bottom-up causality. While
she affirms that the
unpredictability inherent in
chaos theory is extremely
important for an account of
divine action, she is quite
right in not allowing
Polkinghorne the critical




(unlike Peacocke's) depends on ontological
openness for its top-down account of divine
agency.
Her critique of Polkinghorne's leap
aside, Murphy challenges his vagueness con-
cerning the manner of God's agency in the
world. In a rather vague critique, she asks
to whom and how non-energetic informa-
tion might be contributed. 30 And, ignoring
the "holistic" top-down character of divine
action, and also the theological possibility
of co-creation through double agency, she
worries that God is reduced to "acting as an
agent among other agents." 31
In Murphy's own metaphysical pro-
posal, she considers herself as allowing both
chaos theory and top-down causation "a sub-
sidiary role." 32 She posits that the unpre-
dictability inherent in chaos theory gives
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God, not ontological room in an otherwise
causally determined order, but epistemologi-
cal room within which God can work with-
out upsetting the perception of law-like natu-
ral order. 33 In other words—and presenting
rather odd theology, since the amplification
of fluctuations following initial conditions
renders subsequent macro outcomes unpre-
dictable to us—God, who "prefers to work
on our behalf 'under the cover of chaos,'"
has lots of room to act «
in the world without us
noticing. 34
She affords top-
down causality a subsid-
iary role for two reasons.
Firstly, in her metaphys-
ics she gives primacy
and supremacy in cre-
ation to humans, positing
humans as one of only
two avenues for divine
action in the world. With
this position, she needs top-down causality in
order to posit "God's top-down influence on
the created order through human top-down
agency." 35 Secondly, since her metaphysics
posits God's respect of the integrity of each
created entity, she must acknowledge that "the
inherent powers of an entity in isolation will
not tell us what it can do when incorporated
into a higher regime." 3h The whole affects
the parts. Nevertheless, it is to the parts, to
the "mediated causality" of the whole, that
Murphy turns in her account of divine agency.
While she bases her metaphysics on "onto-
logical reductionism," 37 she claims that her
metaphysical proposal is not "based on the
particularities of quantum theory." 38 How-
ever, this claim stands on shaky ground.
Having granted subatomic entities "ex-
istence independent of God," 39 Murphy, in
keeping with chaos theory, allows that it is
impossible to "predict exactly when they will
do whatever they do." 4" This is a claim of
epistemological unpredictability. But then, in
a leap of the sort she disallows Polkinghorne,
she assumes that they never have "sufficient
reason" ever to do anything. Surely, this is
an ontological claim. It is a claim about what
is the case. Perhaps in quantum theory it
might be justified to speculate as to insuffi-
cient reason, and Murphy does this.
"|Q]uantum events do not obey determinis-
tic laws [and] [individual events violate the
principle of sufficient reason...." 41 But
given the underlying predictability of chaos
theory, there is no necessity to posit insuffi-
Murphy argues that God's governance is
not dominance but co-operation. How-
ever, if, as she says, God makes all the
decisions at this level, it is hard to see
how this could be construed as co-opera-
tion. God's action smacks of control.
cient reason. In doing so. Murphy has moved
from the realm of epistemology in chaos
theory to the realm of the ontological inde-
terminacy of quantum theory.
Having assumed no "sufficient reason."
external or internal, for any subatomic en-
tity to act. Murphy presents the false di-
chotomy of "complete randomness or divine
determination." Any notion of choice that
might have been extracted from the analogy
of the Buridian ass is nixed. Murphy's sub-
atomic particles are allowed no choice, no
chance to respond to each other or to the en-
vironment. Nor can they remain passive and
be moved by an environment, like a leaf in
the wind. Complete randomness is rejected
simply because it is counter-intuitive.
Since it is hard to see how the episte-
mological unpredictability of chaos theory,
with its underlying determinism, is counter-
intuitive, it can only be assumed that Murphy
is, once again, making an ontological claim
of indeterminacy. It would seem, then, that,
notwithstanding her claim to the contrary,
Murphy's metaphysics is dependent on the
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particularities of quantum theory. At the in-
determinate level of quantum theory, she
finds an ontological gap for God. 42 And, not
seeing that she has made any ontological
claims at all, Muiphy leaps back into episte-
mological unpredictability by declaring God
to be a kind of "'hidden variable" in chaotic
determinism.
Although Murphy would not agree, it
appears that on the one hand God enters the
ontological gap postulated in quantum in-
determinacy, and on the other hand God ac-
counts for the lack of a fundamental gap in
the epistemological unpredictability of chaos
theory. Murphy's metaphysics has one foot
in quantum theory and one foot in chaos
theory.
Instead of rejoicing at the first-ever ad-
mission by the scientific community that the
universe is not a closed causal system, in-
stead of envisioning new possibilities for co-
creation and new possibilities for theology,
instead of enlarging our concept of God,
Muiphy insists, on "a strong measure of di-
vine determinism at the most basic level of
natural processes." 43 She reduces God to fit
a scientific gap. And, ironically, her reason
for doing so is theological:
By taking quantum events as the
primary locus for divine action it will be
possible to meet many of the theological
needs placed upon my theory.44
In traditional theology God provides "sus-
tenance, governance and co-operation." 45 As
well, God is consistent and non-coercive.
Muiphy cites Jesus as the model of the non-
coercive nature of God. In her metaphys-
ics, Muiphy "claimfsj that the relevant fea-
ture of God's action in Christ, displayed
analogously throughout the whole, is its non-
coercive character." 46
Regarding God's character and agency
at the quantum level, Muiphy 's metaphys-
ics says that God has created each individual
entity at that level. Created entities are
ontologically other than God; they have their
own being and integrity. Each entity has the
potential to function in the capacity for
which God created it; however, one must
stop short of saying that each subatomic en-
tity has the ability to function in the capac-
ity for which God created it. No entity can
act without God's action. God is the "nec-
essary but not sufficient condition" 47 for all
action at this quantum level.48
God's governance at the quantum level
consists in activation or actualizing one
or another of the quantum entity's innate
powers at particular instants, and these
events are not possible without God's
action. 49
What is Muiphy saying? She is saying
that in the created world, fundamental, in-
trinsic agency is out of the question.
Granted, she is considering the subatomic
quantum level; but an important principle
is at stake. Even given an innate capacity
to act, an entity is impotent if unable to do
so. If the understanding is that God acts at
this level to sustain the entity in both its
physical integrity and its action, then agency
is not lost. But Muiphy says more than this.
God decides "when" the entity will act.
Surely agency involves deciding when.
Surely an entity's "natural right," which
Murphy says God respects, includes the
right to decide. An innate capacity to swing
one's arm even as one is created and sus-
tained by God does not constitute agency.
The intention and decision to extend it to
one's neighbor does. In Murphy's meta-
physics, God is the sole agent at the quan-
tum level.
This proposition has implications for
agency at higher levels, including human
agency, especially as
the attempt to find indeterminacy
between the quantum and human level is
unnecessary if we have already made
allowance for God's action at the most
basic levels of organization.... 5U
Muiphy admits that
macroscopic objects are composed of the
entities of atomic and subatomic physics.
This being the case, much (but not all) of
the behavior of macro-level objects is
determined by the behavior of their
smallest constituents. 51
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And the behavior of these smallest constitu-
ents appears to be controlled by God.
Murphy argues that God's governance
is not dominance, but co-operation. How-
ever, if, as she says, God makes all the deci-
sions at this level, it is hard to see how this
could be construed as cooperation. If God
decides "when" an entity will act, God's ac-
tion is more than sustenance and less than
co-operation. God's action smacks of con-
trol. God "act[s] upon..." 52 entities. Fur-
ther, Murphy writes with approval that God
does not compete with entities; but clearly
this is because there is no contest. And as
for God being non-coercive, her analogy
with Jesus breaks down. Jesus allows the
blind man to come to him and asks the blind
man what he wants. Jesus does not just act
on his behalf. There is no inkling from
Murphy that the subatomic entities have any
input regarding their "intentions." God's in-
tention is the sole determining factor. 53
Regarding God's intentionality, Murphy
is somewhat ambiguous. The statement, "all
events are manifestations of divine will," 54
Perhaps, just as science cannot account
for consciousness, science should not be
expected to accountfor divine agency.
It seems impossible and theologically
self-defeating to try to transfuse science
with purpose. God and humans are
intrinsically purposeful; science is not.
seems straightforward. However, less so is
the statement that while "all events are the
result of God's causal influence; only some
events express (to us) God's intentions." 55
Thus far, given the caveat "to us," it can still
be maintained that all events constitute God's
intentions, God's divine will. However,
Murphy adds, "[i]t is the latter that ought, strict-
ly speaking, to be called God's actions." 56 This
assumption must be challenged.
To begin with, is not causal influence
God's action? If not, then God's agency is
undermined. But most importantly, given
theology's assertion that for God there is no
gap between God's will and God's action,
one must ask, Are not all God's actions God's
intentions? And are not all God's intentions
God's actions? Again, if not, then God's
agency (and ontology) is undermined. Fur-
ther, not only does Murphy's definition of
God's action assume superior status for hu-
mans in the created order, but it conjures up
images of a God who operates on automatic
pilot, when not specifically communicating
intentions to humans.
And here is the crux of the matter con-
cerning the theological reductionism inher-
ent in Murphy's metaphysics: In forcing
God into a subatomic gap, the very concept
of God is reduced. As evidence, the terms
speak for themselves. God "engineers" de-
sired outcomes. 57 God works through sub-
atomic "manipulations." 58 God tampers with
initial conditions at the quantum level. 5 " At
the human level, God "stimulates
neurons. ..[to] cause thoughts
to be recalled to mind." r "
Even if God does these
things to "bring about ex-
traordinary events," 61 these
are not satisfactory theo-
logical concepts!
A God who engineers,
manipulates, tampers and
messes around in the brain"2
does not fit with the God re-
vealed in Christ. Granted,
dreams and wakeful asso-
ciations can be of God, but top-down cau-
sality would account for these in a way more
consonant with experience both of God and
of humans. In any case, by the time this part
of Murphy's proposal is reached, the con-
cept of God as some tiny, meddlesome be-
ing is too strong to erase. The damage of
theological reductionism is done. A satis-
factory metaphysics must expand, not limit,
the concept of God.
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Another, different sort of theological
reductionism is Murphy's use of God as a
convenience when her scientific argument
thins. For instance, "natural processes look
so much like. . .determinate forces," because,
basically, God wants it that way. "[0]ne of
God's chief purposes is (must have been) to
produce... an orderly system." 63 It does no
service to theology to inject God into an ar-
gument in this way.
However, the main manifestation of
theological reductionism—a reductionism
that would require of Christians in some tra-
ditions too high a price—is the loss of the
essence of the Trinitarian God as relational.
God is a relational God in both the realm of
theologia and economic!. Relationship pre-
sumes free agency and free response. 64
There remains the awful suspicion, in read-
ing Murphy's account of divine agency, that
human agency is undermined at the quan-
tum level. Is not governance a rather out-
moded concept? Control is in the air, rather
than sustenance and co-operation. Murphy
misses the relational essence of her argument
for mediated causality.
She rightly posits that
team spirit only affects an individual
insofar as sights and sounds emanating
from the other people affect the
individual's sensory organs. 65
What she misses is that this is a relational
analogy, involving free response to free en-
vironmental input. There is no sense that
God is manipulating the individual in any
way. Individual persons register the envi-
ronmental action toward, not upon, them and
respond. They are free to act in participat-
ing in the activities of the team. Jesus so
affected his disciples that they freely decided
to follow him in God's work. If, in one's
theology, God rejoices in such freedom and
such response, and if it is to this kind of God
that we can respond, then Murphy's theol-
ogy falls short.
Polkinghome, in the context of the in-
creasingly holistic outlook of science, writes
that it is
clearly worthwhile to pursue the
program of reductionist explanation as
far as it can legitimately be pursued, but
that is a methodological strategy for
investigation, not a metaphysical
strategy determining the total nature of
reality.
66
In the context of both science and theology,
it is Murphy's move, from a methodological
strategy of ontological reductionism to a
metaphysical strategy determining divine
agency, that results in theological reduction-
ism.
Perhaps, just as science cannot account
for consciousness, science should not be ex-
pected to account for divine agency. It seems
impossible and theologically self-defeating
to try to transfuse science with putpose. God
and humans are intrinsically purposeful; sci-
ence is not.
Instead of trying to make theology fit
science it might be better to start with an as-
sumption of God's presence as the environ-
ment in which we have our being. In this
context, the data of theology can be consid-
ered—namely, human experience and ac-
tions. Murphy alludes to these data but does
not engage them. In the context of top-down
causality she writes,
natural beings and processes operate
somewhat differently in the presence of
people imbued with the presence of
God. 67
Does faith in God impart a new bound-
ary condition in which the individual has the
potential and freedom to respond and be
transformed? While top-down causation
would best account for such a reality, it is
possible that no amount of scientific explo-
ration will ever enable us fully to understand
the glorious mystery of our God, ourselves,
and our world. This does not preclude a dia-
logue between science and theology. If the-
ology does not try to "fit God into" science,
and if science does not try to "shut God out,"
then science and theology can talk to each
other. In such a climate for dialogue, there
is hope that the awesome discoveries of sci-
ence might fire the theological imagination
and expand and illuminate the concept of
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God. There is room for science. And fur-
thermore, in such a climate, there is hope
that the developments of quantum physics
and dialogue with theology might open the
scientific mind to the possibility that what
science describes is not necessarily the way
things are. There is room for God.
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